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The Federal Communications Commission prohibits a business from owning a 
small newspaper and a small radio station or television station in the same town. I argue 
that the FCC’s cross-ownership rules containing these prohibitions should be repealed 











The FCC Cross-Ownership Rules Should Be Repealed 
 
Robert W. Hahn 
 
A generation ago, most Americans waited in line for bank tellers, thought a long-
distance phone call was a luxury, and learned of news either from a local newspaper or a 
handful of local television and radio stations.  Automatic teller machines, wireless 
phones, and the Internet were fantasies.  Federal and state governments regulated the 
ownership of banks, telephone companies, and broadcast stations with a strong arm, not 
permitting companies in one line of business to own much else. 
  Technology has changed, and so too has much of government law and policy 
regarding corporate ownership.  The rules limiting the ownership of banks, telephone 
companies, and many other assets have been modified to allow for more competition. 
  One exception is a curious set of rules written by the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) over a quarter century ago to prohibit one company from owning 
both a newspaper and a broadcast station in the same market.
1   Strangely, one company 
may lawfully own every newspaper in town.  And many companies may lawfully own 
more than one broadcast station.  But if one company should try to own both one tiny 
daily newspaper and one weak broadcast station, that company would be violating 
current FCC rules. 
The newspaper-broadcast ownership rules are triggered only if a newspaper 
owner attempts to purchase a broadcast station, or a broadcast station owner attempts to 
purchase a newspaper. The automatic trigger makes little sense. In this comment, I argue 
that the newspaper-broadcast ownership rules are not likely to serve a useful function, 
and therefore should be repealed.  
                                                 
1 Appendix A, Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission’s Rules Relating to 
Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, Second Report and Order, 
Docket No. 18110, 50 FCC 2d 1046 (1975).  
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Specifically, I consider the following five questions:  
(1) Does the federal government have specific agencies with the authority and 
expertise to evaluate any competitive harm that might arise from the acquisition 
of one asset by a company? 
(2) Should the government have multiple rounds of antitrust review for the 
acquisition of one asset by one company? 
(3) Should the government categorically prohibit one class of business from ever 
owning a certain asset? 
(4) Is there a clear and unambiguous distinction between promoting diversity in a 
market and protecting competition? 
(5) Is there a mechanism to provide a basis for removing the rules? 
 
1.  Does the federal government have specific agencies with the authority and 
expertise to evaluate any competitive harm that might arise from the 
acquisition of one asset by a company? 
  The answer to this question is “yes.”  
The federal government has two agencies, the Department of Justice and the 
Federal Trade Commission, which enforce antitrust laws to protect consumers. They 
enforce laws prohibiting anticompetitive behavior, such as price fixing, and they review 
mergers for potential anticompetitive problems. Because they coordinate with each other, 
just one of these agencies reviews all major mergers for compliance with antitrust laws.  
Many states also have active antitrust agencies or departments that monitor and review 
proposed transactions to ensure the welfare of citizens in their states.  
  The federal agencies have large, professional staffs that review all mergers of any 
significant size.  The professional antitrust staffs rely on fact-based market analyses, 
described in the FTC-DOJ Merger Guidelines, and developed in detail in numerous court 
cases.
2  The merger review process at the antitrust agencies is predictable based on well-
established precedents.  Merging parties have a burden to produce requested documents,  
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and the federal agencies have a burden to challenge mergers in court in order to block 
them.  The federal antitrust agencies are concerned  not merely with the measures of 
current competition in the market but with the ease of entry and exit in the market as 
well.   
2.  Should the government have multiple rounds of antitrust review for the 
acquisition of one asset by one company? 
  The short answer is “no.” One agency with the relevant expertise is enough.  
  Yet, for some heavily regulated industries, such as electric utilities, banks, and 
telecommunications companies, a second, duplicative federal merger review takes place.
3  
An additional review is conducted by the federal agency that regulates the industry, such 
as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Federal Reserve Board, or the Federal 
Communications Commission.   
  For the additional federal review, the merging parties have an obligation to 
produce requested information, but the reviewing agency has no obligation to go to court 
to block a merger. The agency can simply refuse to issue a required regulatory license. 
Businesses need these federal licenses to operate a federal bank, an electricity distribution 
company, or a radio station.  
Unfortunately, these agencies do not have a well-defined merger review process 
that has been honed by decades of court precedent. Instead, they have an unpredictable 
process with unspecified standards.
4  
Moreover, a proposed merger can pass muster under federal antitrust law at the 
specialized antitrust agencies, but fail to pass another round of federal merger tests 
imposed by the regulatory agency--a form of double jeopardy. The multiple reviews also 
provide an opportunity for agencies to seek additional “rents” from the merging parties.
5  
                                                                                                                                                 
2 See, e.g., Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 1997 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 
1997, which were based on previously published guidelines in 1984 and 1992.  Available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/toc.html. 
3 The review by the FTC or the DOJ typically precedes the review by the regulatory agency. 
4 The Federal Communications Commission reviews mergers between broadcast station owners.  The 
Commission has no rules to describe to the public how it evaluates such mergers.  Recently, the FCC 
sought comment on how it should evaluate radio mergers.  See “Rules and Policies Concerning Multiple 
Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local Markets" (MM Docket 01-317) and "Definition of Radio 
Markets,” (MM Docket 00-244),  Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, FCC 01-329, released November 9, 2001. 
5 McChesney, Fred S.  1997.  Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion.  
Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts.  
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This double jeopardy imposes substantial costs on the unfortunate firms in the 
specialized industries that decide that they may want to merge.  Even if all goes smoothly 
in the two stages of review, the merger is still delayed longer than it likely would be if it 
were reviewed by a single agency. The likelihood that all will go smoothly is also 
significantly reduced with two reviewing agencies involved.  Delays and uncertain 
outcomes are costs to the merging parties that, in some instances, may cause them to 
avoid efficient mergers entirely. 
  The federal merger review process is discriminatory in that one set of merging 
firms faces one process, and similarly situated firms in certain specialized industries face 
an entirely different process.  One set of firms faces a predictable process; the other an 
unpredictable process.   
 
3.  Should the government categorically prohibit one class of business from ever 
owning a certain asset? 
  Categorical prohibitions generally do not promote economic efficiency. The 
newspaper cross-ownership rule is no exception. From an economic perspective, it is 
impossible to construct efficient rules that categorically prohibit the joint ownership of 
two or more assets, based on either the characteristics of the assets or the characteristics 
of the market.   
An inefficient ownership rule, such as the current newspaper cross-ownership 
rule, cannot be modified to be efficient based on a theory that there is a more efficient 
version of the rule, if only it can be properly calibrated.  The rule makes no more sense if 
limited to large or small newspapers, or large or small broadcast stations, or large or 
small markets.   
To the extent that there are anticompetitive concerns for the joint ownership of 
specific assets in a specific market, those transactions should be evaluated on a case-by-
case basis.  That is why the antitrust agencies, which review all types of mergers, refrain 
from using any blanket prohibitions based on either assets or markets.
6 Ironically, only 
agencies that are not specialists in merger reviews, such as the FCC, have such blanket 
prohibitions. 
                                                 
6 See 1997 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.  
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  To illustrate the point, consider two kinds of proposed mergers – one between two 
newspapers and a  second between a newspaper and a local radio station. A merger 
between two newspapers in one market would be reviewed by just one antitrust agency, 
the FTC.  That agency is competent, in my view, to render a decision that would protect 
the public interest from any possible abuse that might arise from the merger. 
   In contrast, consider a merger between a newspaper and a local radio station.  
Such mergers are proscribed by the FCC. The FCC rule is equivalent to holding that 
reviews by one, two, or a thousand federal agencies will be inadequate to protect the 
public from the harms that could arise from a merger between a newspaper and a 
broadcast station.  No matter what economic efficiencies and consumer benefits may 
arise from such a merger, FCC rules prohibit it.  The subtle and sophisticated antitrust 
analysis used to evaluate mergers in all other industries gives way to a rather unsubtle, 
blunt tool:  the FCC’s newspaper cross-ownership prohibition.  Such a proposed merger 
is denied without considering the potential benefits to consumers.  
 
4.  Is there a clear and unambiguous distinction between promoting diversity in 
a market and protecting competition?  
  I believe the goal of promoting diversity is likely to be met when the government 
protects competition, and thus the distinction between the two is overdrawn.  
  The measures of “diversity” used by the FCC are difficult to distinguish from the 
measures of “competition” used by the antitrust agencies.  In the end, the presence of 
diversity is difficult to distinguish from the presence of competition.  Expansion of 
diversity is likely to be measured as expansion of competition as well.  Ease of entry (and 
exit) into a market for competitive purposes is likely to be indistinguishable from ease of 
entry (and exit) for diversity purposes. 
  It is hypothetically possible to posit an example in which antitrust authorities 
would find substantial competition and entry in a market, but in which a diversity 
analysis would find diversity stifled.  But it is difficult to point to an example in the real 
world.
7   
 
                                                 
7 One possible example is a typical small rural market that is not automatically reviewed by antitrust 
authorities. Even there, however, antitrust law allows private actions to block mergers.   
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5.  Is there a mechanism to provide a basis for removing the rules? 
  The answer to this is “yes.” Congress requires not one, but two biennial reviews 
of rules. 
There is a general biennial review of all telecommunications rules under Section 
11. That section potentially encompasses thousands of rules, but the Commission has not 
taken it seriously.  In addition, Section 202 requires the FCC to review just its broadcast 
ownership rules, of which there are fewer than a dozen, once every two years
8.  Industry 
takes this section very seriously and comments vigorously.  
 
Conclusion 
  The federal government has a well-organized, professional antitrust review 
process in place at the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission to 
protect the American consumer.  Multiple antitrust reviews do nothing to provide 
additional protection to consumers and do much to discourage otherwise efficient 
corporate restructuring.  The government should not categorically prohibit one class of 
businesses from ever acquiring a specific asset.  The FCC’s diversity analysis does little 
if anything beneficial beyond what antitrust analysis provides. 
  Antitrust analysis is designed to distinguish between corporate restructurings that 
benefit consumers and those that harm consumers.  The newspaper-cross-ownership 
rules, in the name of diversity, are likely to prohibit some transactions that would 
otherwise be efficient and beneficial to consumers. 
  When Congress asked the Commission to review its cross-ownership rules every 
two years, it was not an invitation to change the rule incrementally so that the biennial 
proceeding can be repeated forever. To the extent the current cross-ownership rules are 
inefficient, fiddling at the margins is not likely to make much difference. They simply 
should be repealed.   
                                                 
8 Section 202, Telecommunications Act of 1996  – “FURTHER COMMISSION REVIEW—The 
Commission shall review its rules adopted pursuant to this section and all of its ownership rules biennially 
as part of its regulatory reform review under section 11 of the Communications Act of 1934 and shall 
determine whether any of such rules are necessary in the public interest as the result of competition.  The 
Commission shall repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be no longer in the public interest.” 